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Abstract. Instead of the costly encryption algorithms traditionally em-
ployed in auction schemes, efficient Goldwasser-Micali encryption is used
to design a new sealed-bid auction. Multiplicative homomorphism in-
stead of the traditional additive homomorphism is exploited to achieve
security and high efficiency in the auction. The new scheme is the cur-
rently known most efficient non-interactive sealed-bid auction with bid
privacy.
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1 Introduction
Auction is an important tool to distribute resources. In many sealed-bid appli-
cations, it is desired to protect privacy of the losing bids, which is called bid
privacy. Various cryptology-based methods have been applied to achieve bid
privacy. A very popular method is homomorphic bid opening. With this bid
opening mechanism, each bidder employs a homomorphic encryption algorithm
or a homomorphic secret sharing algorithm to seal their bids, while the auc-
tioneers exploit homomorphism of the encryption algorithm or secret sharing
algorithm to open the bids collectively instead of separately so that no losing
bid is revealed. So far all the known homomorphic bid opening mechanisms are
based on additive homomorphic sealing functions like Shamir’s secret sharing [10]
(and its variants) and Paillier encryption [5], so are called additive homomorphic
bid opening, and we call the resulting sealed-bid auction additive homomorphic
auction.
Bid validity check, an operation ignored in many auction schemes, is nec-
essary in additive homomorphic sealed-bid auction schemes. So additive ho-
momorphic sealed-bid auction cannot be efficient as bid validity check is very
inefficient. A novel homomorphic sealed-bid auction called multiplicative homo-
morphic sealed-bid auction is designed in this paper for both first bid auction
and Vickrey auction. It employs a modified Goldwasser-Micali (G-M) encryp-
tion algorithm for bid sealing, which is multiplicative homomorphic. Multiplica-
tive homomorphism of the modified Goldwasser-Micali encryption algorithm is
exploited to implement multiplicative homomorphic bid opening, which deter-
mines the winning bid without revealing any losing bid. The new auction scheme
achieves all the usually desired properties in sealed-bid auction. The greatest
advantage of multiplicative homomorphic sealed-bid auction is that costly bid
validity check is not needed and the bidders can bid through an unreliable com-
munication channel using a low-capability device. So, both bidding and bid open-
ing are very efficient and the resulting auction is a practical scheme with low
requirements on computation and communication. This new scheme is the most
efficient known non-interactive sealed-bid auction protecting privacy of losing
bids.
2 Background
Sealed-bid auction usually contains four phases: preparation phase, bidding
phase, bid opening phase and winner determination phase. In the preparation
phase, the auction system is set up and the auction rule is published. In the
bidding phase, every bidder submits a sealed bid through a communication net-
work. In the bid opening phase, some auctioneers open the bids to determine
the winning price. In the winner determination phase, the winner is identified.
The following properties are often desired in sealed-bid auction.
1. Correctness: The auction result is determined strictly according to the
auction rule.
2. Public verifiability: Correctness of the auction must be publicly verifiable.
3. Fairness: No bidder can take advantage of other bidders (e.g. recover other
bids and choose or change his own bids according to other bids).
4. Undeniability: Any bidder, especially the winner, cannot deny his bid.
5. Confidentiality: Each bid remains confidential before the bid opening
phase starts.
6. Bid Privacy: Confidentiality of the losing bids must be still retained after
the auction finishes. Strictly speaking, no information about any losing bid
should be revealed except what can be deduced from the auction result.
7. Price flexibility: The price space is large enough and the bids can be as
precise as the bidders like.
8. Rule flexibility: Any auction rule can be applied.
9. Robustness: The auction can still run properly in abnormal situations such
as existence of invalid bid or tie.
In a sealed-bid auction there are n bidders, m auctioneers and L biddable
prices in decreasing order. Various auction rules may be employed in a sealed-
bid auction. The two most common auction rules, first bid auction and Vickrey
auction, are the main interest of this paper. In a first bid auction, the bidder with
the highest bid wins and pays the highest bid. In a Vickrey auction, the bidder
with the highest bid wins but pays the second highest bid. Another frequently
employed auction rule is the ith bid auction, where n− 1 identical items are on
sale. In the ith bid auction, all bidders with bids higher than the ith bid win, pay
the ith bid and each gets an item. In this paper, we are specially interested in
bid privacy while e-auction schemes without bid privacy like [9] are not studied.
Currently, there are two methods to implement bid privacy: secure evaluation
and one-choice-per-price strategy.
Secure evaluation is also called multiparty computation, which employs an
evaluation circuit composed of a few logic gates to evaluate the encrypted bids
and output the auction result. A drawback of secure evaluation in sealed-bid
auction is low efficiency. The most efficient private auction employing secure
evaluation is [3], which is still not efficient enough for real-world applications.
One-choice-per-price strategy is frequently applied in sealed-bid auctions to
achieve bid privacy. Under this strategy, each bidder must make a choice (indi-
cating willingness or unwillingness to pay) at every biddable price to form his
bidding vector. If a bidder is willing to pay a price, he chooses an integer stand-
ing for “YES” as his choice at that price. If a bidder is unwilling to pay a price,
he chooses an integer standing for “NO” as his choice at that price. The bid-
ders seal their bidding vectors (including their choices at all the biddable prices)
and publish the sealed bidding vectors in the bidding phase. In the bid opening
phase, a bid opening function finds the winning bid among the biddable prices
while revealing no losing bid.
Apparently, the bid opening function in one-choice-per-price auction must be
specially designed so that the winning price can be correctly determined while
bid privacy is protected. According to different communication architectures, the
existing bid opening functions in one-choice-per-price sealed-bid auctions can be
classified into interactive bid opening and non-interactive bid opening. If non-
interactive bid opening is employed, the bidders do not communicate with the
auctioneers after they submit their bids. If interactive bid opening is employed,
the bidders have to communicate with the auctioneers (usually for many rounds)
to open their bids in the bid opening phase. According to the searching route
in the winning price search, the existing bid opening functions in one-choice-
per-price sealed-bid auctions can be classified into downward searching function
and binary searching function. Downward searching function unseals the sealed
choices price by price downwards from the highest biddable price until a “YES”
choice is unsealed at a price. With binary searching function, the biddable prices
form a binary tree and the binary searching route starts at the tree root and
ends at a tree leaf.
Interactive bid opening is impractical in most applications, especially when
the auction is precise, as it requires O(L) rounds of communication between
the bidders and the auctioneers. It is costly in communication and requires
a reliable communication channel, which is always available instantly. So only
non-interactive auctions are considered in this paper. Non-interactive downward
search [7] is highly inefficient in computation since O(nL) modulus exponenti-
ations are needed in both the bidding phase and in the bid opening phase. So,
many non-interactive binary-search auction schemes with one-choice-per-price
strategy [8] have been proposed, claiming to achieve higher efficiency than non-
interactive downward search auctions. All the existing non-interactive binary-
search auction schemes employ a technique called additive homomorphic bid
opening, so are also called additive homomorphic auctions.
To implement additive homomorphic bid opening, an additive homomor-
phic encryption (like [5]) or additive homomorphic secret sharing scheme (like
Shamir’s secret sharing [10] and its variants) must be employed. A secret sharing
scheme is additive homomorphic if the shares of multiple secrets can be summed
up to recover the sum of the secrets. An encryption scheme is additive homo-
morphic if decryption of the product of multiple ciphertexts is the sum of the
messages encrypted in those ciphertexts. The bidders use additive homomorphic
encryption with distributed decryption or additive homomorphic secret sharing
to seal their bidding choices where a non-zero integer (usually 1) is chosen to
represent “YES” and zero is chosen to represent “NO”. Then the auctioneers
exploit additive homomorphism of the sealing function to test whether the sum
of all the choices at every price on the binary searching route is over a thresh-
old. It is true that additive homomorphic bid opening function is usually more
efficient than downward searching bid opening function. However, that does not
mean additive homomorphic auctions (with non-interactive binary search) are
more efficient than non-interactive downward search auctions because an addi-
tional operation, bid validity check, is always necessary in additive homomorphic
auctions. Bid validity check guarantees that each sealed choice in every bidding
vector contains either “YES” or “NO” and nothing else, namely they are valid.
Traditionally bid validity check is only employed when Vickrey auction or the
ith bid auction is applied, and ignored in first-bid auction. Recently, it is illus-
trated [6] that bid validity check is necessary in first bid auction as well. So, bid
validity check is always necessary in additive homomorphic auctions no matter
the auction rule is first-bid auction, Vickrey auction or the ith bid auction. Proof
and verification of validity of all the bidding choices cost O(nL) exponentiations,
more precisely O(L) exponentiations per bidder and O(nL) exponentiations per
auctioneer. This is a very high cost. Therefore additive homomorphic auctions
are inefficient as well.
The new sealed-bid auction in this paper also employs one-choice-per-price
strategy and non-interactive binary search. However, it uses novel bid sealing
function and opening function: modified G-M bid opening and multiplicative
homomorphic bid opening. The new sealed-bid auction scheme, called multi-
plicative homomorphic auction, has two outstanding advantages.
– As the plaintext space of the modified G-M encryption is the same as the
bidding space (both contain two same integers, respectively representing
“NO” and “YES”), costly bid validity check (usually including bid validity
proof by the bidders and bid validity verification by the auctioneers, both of
which are inefficient) is not needed.
– Sealing of each bidding choice only costs a couple of multiplications and
the auction is non-interactive. So the bidders can bid through an unreliable
communication channel using a low-capability device.
All the desired properties in sealed-bid auction are efficiently and practically
achieved in the new auction scheme. The new auction is the currently known
most efficient and only practical sealed-bid auction scheme achieving bid privacy.
3 Modified Goldwasser-Micali Encryption
The probabilistic encryption scheme proposed by Goldwasser and Micali [1] has
been widely used in many cryptographic applications. It is modified in this paper
as follows.
1. Key Generation
Two large primes p and q with roughly the same size are chosen to be the
private key. The public key is composed of N = pq and y, a quadratic non-
residue modulo N with Jacobi symbol 1.
2. Message space and ciphertext space: {1,−1} −→ Q where Q contains all the
integers with Jacobi symbol 1 in Z∗N .
3. Encryption
– If the message is 1, the ciphertext is x2 mod N where x is randomly
chose from Z∗N .
– If the message is -1, the ciphertext is yx2 mod N where x is randomly
chose from Z∗N .
4. Decryption: If an integer with Jacob symbol -1 is given as the ciphertext,
the decryption fails and the integer is delacred as an invalid cphertext1. If a
valid ciphertext is given, output the Legendre symbol of the ciphertext.
The only modification from the original G-M encryption is that the messages
space is changed from {0, 1} to {1,−1}. So after the modification, the G-M en-
cryption scheme is still semantically secure. Moreover, it becomes multiplicative
homomorphic. Namely, D(c1)D(c2) = D(c1c2) holds for decryption function D()
and any ciphertexts c1 and c2. The property of low computational cost when the
message space is not too large is also inherited from the original G-M encryp-
tion. An encryption averagely costs 1.5 multiplication. The cost of a decryption
(calculating Legendre symbol when the factoriztion of N is known) is compa-
rable to a multiplication. For simplicity, a decryption is assumed to cost one
multiplication in this paper.
In the application to auction (which must be publicly verifiable) in this paper,
it is required to publicly prove and verify correctness of each decryption. If the
decryption party output 1 given a ciphertext c, he must publish a ZK proof of
knowledge of a square root of c to guarantee correctness of his decryption. If the
decryption party output −1 given a ciphertext c, he must publish a ZK proof
1 Computation for Jacob symbol is efficient and comparable to a multiplication, so
invalid ciphertext can be discovered easily.
of knowledge of a square root of cy to guarantee correctness of his decryption.
As the decryption party knows factorization of N , he can efficiently calculate a
square root of any quadratic residue and use the ZK proof in [2] to prove the
knowledge of the square root.
4 G-M-Based Multiplicative Homomorphic Sealed-Bid
Auction
The modified Goldwasser-Micali encryption algorithm in Section 3 is employed
for the bidders to encrypt the bids in the new auction scheme, which is called
multiplicative homomorphic sealed-bid auction. One advantage of the modified
G-M encryption is high efficiency, especially when the encrypted message is
short. As each choice in the bidding vector in one-choice-per-price auction is one
bit long (either “YES” or “NO”), sealing through the modified G-M encryption
is very efficient. Another advantage of the modified G-M encryption is that
bid validity check is unnecessary in multiplicative homomorphic auction as the
message space of each choice in the bidding vector is the same as the plaintext
space of the modified G-M encryption algorithm. So the efficiency bottleneck
(bid validity check) in the traditional homomorphic auctions can be removed.
A bid opening function exploiting multiplicative homomorphism of the mod-
ified G-M encryption algorithm is employed in the new auction scheme. If all
the choices at a price are “NO” (represented by 1), the product of any subset of
them is 1. If there is at least one “YES” choice (represented by -1) at a price, the
probability that the product of a random subset of the choices at that price is -1
is 0.5. So if a number (denoted as T1, e.g. 20 or 30) of random subsets are chosen
from all the choices at a price and the product of the choices in each subset is
calculated, all the T1 products are always 1 if all the choices at that price are
“NO”; at least one product is -1 with a probability 1−0.5T1 if at least one of the
choices at that price is “YES”. So if at a price multiplicative homomorphism of
G-M encryption is exploited to repeatedly (for T1 time) decrypt the products of
the encrypted choices in different random subsets without decrypting any single
encrypted choice, bid opening at that price can be implemented without breach-
ing bid privacy. Each product must be verified to be valid (it is the product of
some encrypted choices) for the sake of public verifiability, while each subset
must be kept secret for the sake of complete bid privacy. In this auction scheme,
a zero knowledge proof technique is employed to achieve privacy of the subsets
and large-probability validity of the products. The following symbols are used
in the auction protocol.
– |x| stands for the bit length of an integer x.
– a/b stands for the quotient of integer a divided by integer b.
– a%b stands for the remainder of integer a divided by integer b.
– There are L biddable prices p1, p2, . . . , pL (in decreasing order).
– Integers T1 and T2 are security parameters, which are set to a small values
like 20 or 30.
– ZP ( x1, x2, . . . , xα | CD1, CD2, . . . , CDβ ) stands for a zero knowl-
edge proof of knowledge of secrets x1, x2, . . . , xα satisfying conditions
CD1, CD2, . . . , CDβ .
4.1 The Auction Protocol
The auction protocol is described in this section where both first-bid auction
and Vickrey auction can be applied. Note that two indices k and k′ are used for
the auctioneers in the description. Ak refers to the kth auctioneer holding his
bidding shares and decrypting the product of his bidding shares, while Ak′ refers
to the k′th auctioneer randomizing bidding shares held by other auctioneers.
1. Preparation phase
A bulletin board, acting as a broadcast communication channel, is set up,
where the auction rule is published. m auctioneers A1, A2, . . . , Am are em-
ployed. Each Ak sets up a modified G-M encryption scheme with modulus
Nk, public key yk, encryption function Ek() and decryption function Dk()
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
2. Bidding phase
Each bidder Bi chooses bi,j , his bidding choice at the jth biddable price
for j = 1, 2, . . . , L. If he is willing to pay pj , Bi chooses bi,j = −1. If he
is not willing to pay pj , Bi chooses bi,j = 1. Then Bi randomly chooses
bi,j,k from {1,−1} for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m such that bi,j =
∏m
k=1 bi,j,k. Finally,
Bi calculates ci,j,k = Ek(bi,j,k) for j = 1, 2, . . . , L and k = 1, 2, . . . ,m, then
signs and publishes them on the bulletin board.
3. Bid opening phase
The auctioneers perform a binary search for the winning price in the biddable
prices. The operation at any price pj on the searching route is as follows.
(a) ci,j,k for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and k = 1, 2, . . . ,m are verified to be valid
ciphertexts (with Jacob symbol 1).
(b) Each auctioneer Ak′ randomly chooses secret integer ri,j,t,k′ ∈ {0, 1} for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and t = 1, 2, . . . , T1.
(c) Each auctioneer Ak′ randomly chooses secret integer Rj,k,t,k′ from Z∗Nk
for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m and t = 1, 2, . . . , T1.
(d) Each auctioneer Ak′ calculates and publishes on the bulletin board
Cj,k,t,k′ = R2j,k,t,k′
n∏
i=1
c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk for k = 1, . . . ,m and t = 1, . . . , T1
(e) Each Ak′ publishes on the bulletin board for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1:
ZP ( ri,j,t,k′ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, Rj,k,t,k′ for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
| Cj,k,t,k′ = R2j,k,t,k′
∏n
i=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m ) (1)
where details of the proof are described in Section 4.2.
(f) For t = 1, 2, . . . each auctioneer Ak publishes dj,k,t = Dk(
∏m
k′=1 Cj,k,t,k′)
and proof of correctness of his decryption on the bulletin board until∏m
k=1 dj,k,t = −1 or t = T1. If one decryption returns -1, the search at pj
returns a positive result. Otherwise, the search at pj returns a negative
result.
If the search at pj returns a positive result, the binary search continues
upwards. If the search at pj returns a negative result, the binary search
continues downwards. The tth round of bid opening operation at price pj is
demonstrated in Table 1, where there are three auctioneers A1,A2 and A3.
Finally, the binary search ends at the winner’s bid. In a first bid auction,
the winner’s bid is the winning price and paid by the winner. In a Vickrey
auction, the winner’s bid is removed and the bid opening function is run
again, which stops at the winning price.
Table 1. The tth round of bid opening operation at pj
```````````Ak′
Ak
A1 holds ci,j,1 A2 holds ci,j,2 A3 holds ci,j,3
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n for i = 1, 2, . . . , n for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
A1 selects ri,j,t,1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Cj,1,t,1 = R2j,1,t,1 Cj,2,t,1 = R
2
j,2,t,1 Cj,3,t,1 = R
2
j,3,t,1
Rj,1,t,1, Rj,2,t,1, Rj,3,t,1
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,1
i,j,1
mod N1
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,1
i,j,2
mod N2
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,1
i,j,3
mod N3
A2 selects ri,j,t,2 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Cj,1,t,2 = R2j,1,t,2 Cj,2,t,2 = R
2
j,2,t,2 Cj,3,t,2 = R
2
j,3,t,2
Rj,1,t,2, Rj,2,t,2, Rj,3,t,2
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,2
i,j,1
mod N1
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,2
i,j,2
mod N2
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,2
i,j,3
mod N3
A3 selects ri,j,t,3 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Cj,1,t,3 = R2j,1,t,3 Cj,2,t,3 = R
2
j,2,t,3 Cj,3,t,3 = R
2
j,3,t,3
Rj,1,t,3, Rj,2,t,3, Rj,3,t,3
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,3
i,j,1
mod N1
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,3
i,j,2
mod N2
∏n
i=1
c
ri,j,t,3
i,j,3
mod N3
dj,1,t = D1(Cj,1,t,1 dj,2,t = D2(Cj,2,t,1 dj,3,t = D3(Cj,3,t,1
Cj,1,t,2Cj,1,t,3) Cj,2,t,2Cj,2,t,3) Cj,3,t,2Cj,3,t,3)
4. Winner identification phase
Suppose the J th price is the winner’s bid. Each Ak for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m pub-
lishes Di,J,k = Dk(ci,J,k) for i = 1, 2, . . . , n on the bulletin board. There
must be some I ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} such that ∏mk=1DI,J,k = −1. The auction-
eers prove that decryption operation DI,J,k = Dk(cI,J,k) for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
are performed correctly. BI ’s signature on his bidding vector is verified and
then he is declared as the winner.
4.2 The ZK Proof
ZK Proof (1) for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 is implemented in a novel method. The T1
instances of knowledge is implemented in one proof, which is much more effi-
cient than T1 instances of separate proofs. Although the proof only provides
50% soundness, repeating it multiple times can achieve strong soundness. Ak′
proves (1) for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 by running the following protocol T2 times while
the other auctioneers act as challengers and Al refers to the lth auctioneer chal-
lenging Ak′ .
1. Ak′ randomly chooses ui from {0, 1} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and vk from Z∗Nk for
k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Ak′ calculates and publishes ak = v2k
∏n
i=1 c
ui
i,j,k mod Nk for
k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
2. The other auctioneers corporately and randomly choose wt from {0, 1} for
t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 such that they are random if at least one auctioneer randomly
chooses them. For example,
(a) for l = 1, 2, . . . , k′ − 1, k′ + 1, . . . ,m, Al chooses wl,t from {0, 1} and
publishes hl,t = El(wl,t) = x2l,ty
wl,t
l mod Nl for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1;
(b) for l = 1, 2, . . . , k′ − 1, k′ + 1, . . . ,m, Al publishes wl,t and xl,t for t =
1, 2, . . . , T1;
(c) after hl,t = x2l,ty
wl,t
l mod Nl for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 and l = 1, 2, . . . , k
′ −
1, k′ + 1, . . . ,m have been verified, wt = (
∑k′−1
l=1 wl,t +
∑m
l=k′+1 wl,t)%2
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 are calculated and published.
3. Ak′ calculates and publishes zi = (ui+
∑T1
t=1 wtri,j,t,k′)%2 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n
and sk = vk(
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′)
∏n
i=1 c
(ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )/2
i,j,k mod Nk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,m.
4. Anyone can verify s2k
∏n
i=1 c
zi
i,j,k = ak
∏T1
t=1 C
wt
j,k,t,k′ mod Nk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,m.
These T2 instances of proof and verification can be performed in parallel to
reduce the number of communication rounds, with different commitments ui for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and vk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m and challenges wt for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 in
each instance of course. Note that the challenges in those T2 instances of proof
are only one bit long. Is it possible to use a longer challenge, so that only one
instance of proof is needed like in many other zero knowledge proofs? The answer
is no for two reasons. Firstly, the proof involves integers in 2m different cyclic
groups with different orders, so longer challenges compromise soundness of the
proof. Secondly, longer challenges must work with longer responses, otherwise
the strength of the proof cannot be improved. However, no other appropriate
modulus than 2 can be found for the responses as the integers are in 2m different
cyclic groups with different and unknown orders and publishing the responses
without modulus breaches honest-verifier zero knowledge property of the proof.
5 Security Analysis
Security and efficiency of the new auction scheme are analysed in this section.
Especially, the novel ZK proof in Section 4.2 is demonstrated to be correct, sound
and zero knowledge.
Theorem 1. The proof protocol in Section 4.2 is correct. More precisely, if Ak′
does not deviate from the proof protocol, he can pass the verification.
Proof: If Ak′ does not deviate from the proof protocol, for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
s2k
∏n
i=1 c
zi
i,j,k =
(vk
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′
∏n
i=1 c
(ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )/2
i,j,k )
2
∏n
i=1 c
(ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )%2
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′)
2
∏n
i=1 c
2((ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )/2)
i,j,k c
(ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )%2
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′)
2
∏n
i=1 c
2((ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )/2)+(ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′ )%2
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′)
2
∏n
i=1 c
ui+
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏n
i=1 c
ui
i,j,k)(
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′)
2
∏n
i=1 c
∑T1
t=1
wtri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏n
i=1 c
ui
i,j,k)(
∏T1
t=1R
wt
j,k,t,k′)
2
∏n
i=1
∏T1
t=1 c
wtri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏n
i=1 c
ui
i,j,k)(
∏T1
t=1R
2wt
j,k,t,k′)
∏T1
t=1
∏n
i=1 c
wtri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk
= v2k(
∏n
i=1 c
ui
i,j,k)
∏T1
t=1(R
2wt
j,k,t,k′
∏n
i=1 c
wtri,j,t,k′
i,j,k ) mod Nk
= v2k(
∏n
i=1 c
ui
i,j,k)
∏T1
t=1(R
2
j,k,t,k′
∏n
i=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k )
wt mod Nk
= ak
∏T1
t=1 C
wt
j,k,t,k′ mod Nk
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Theorem 2. The proof protocol in Section 4.2 is specially sound. More pre-
cisely, if Ak′ ’s proof passes the verification with a probability larger than 0.5 and
at least one auctioneer chooses his challenges randomly, he can efficiently calcu-
late ri,j,t,k′ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 and Rj,k,t,k′ for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m,
t = 1, 2, . . . , T1, such that Cj,k,t,k′ = R2j,k,t,k′
∏n
i=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k mod Nk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,m, t = 1, 2, . . . , T1.
Proof: That at least one auctioneer chooses his challenges randomly implies
challenges w1, w2, . . . , wT1 are randomly chosen in Ak′ ’s proof in Section 4.2.
Given the commitments a1, a2, . . . , am and any integer T in {1, 2, . . . , T1},
there must exist challenges w1, w2, . . . , wT1 and wˆT in {0, 1, . . . , 2L−1} such that
wT 6= wˆT and responses zi, zˆi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and sk, sˆk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m
can be found to satisfy the following two equations.
s2k
n∏
i=1
czii,j,k = ak
T1∏
t=1
Cwtj,k,t,k′ mod Nk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (2)
sˆ2k
n∏
i=1
czˆii,j,k = ak(
T−1∏
t=1
Cwtj,k,t,k′)C
wˆT
j,k,T,k′
T1∏
t=T+1
Cwtj,k,t,k′ mod Nk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
(3)
Otherwise, given a1, a2, . . . , am and any w1, w2, . . . , wT−1, wT+1, . . . , wT1 , re-
sponses zi for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and sk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m can be found for at most
one wT to satisfy s2k
∏n
i=1 c
zi
i,j,k = ak
∏T1
t=1 C
wt
j,k,t,k′ mod Nk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
This deduction implies among the 2T1 possible combinations of w1, w2, . . . , wT1 ,
at most 2T1−1 of them can be the challenges such that correct responses zi
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n and sk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m can be found for the commit-
ments a1, a2, . . . , am to satisfy s2k
∏n
i=1 c
zi
i,j,k = ak
∏T1
t=1 C
wt
j,k,t,k′ mod Nk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,m. This conclusion leads to a contradiction: correct responses zi for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n and sk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m can be found for a random set of chal-
lenges w1, w2, . . . , wT1 to pass the verification in the protocol in Section 4.2 with
a probability no larger than 0.5.
Without losing generality, suppose wT = 1 and wˆT = 0. Equation (2) divided
by Equation (3) yields
(sksˆ−1k )
2
n∏
i=1
czi−zˆii,j,k = Cj,k,T,k′ mod Nk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. (4)
Note that Equation (4) is true for any integer T in {1, 2, . . . , T1}. 2
Theorem 3. The proof protocol in Section 4.2 is honest-verifier zero knowledge.
Proof: For simplicity of the proof, suppose ci,j,k has Jacob symbol 1 for i =
1, 2, . . . , n. In the proof transcript, ak distributes uniformly in all the integers
with Jacobi symbol 1 in ZNk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m; each of w1, w2, . . . , wT1 dis-
tributes uniformly in {0, 1} if at least one co-auctioneer chooses his challenges to
Ak′ randomly; zi distributes uniformly in {0, 1} for i = 1, 2, . . . , n; sk distributes
uniformly in all the integers with Jacobi symbol 1 in ZNk for k = 1, 2, . . . ,m. So
anyone can randomly chooses wt from {0, 1} for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1, zi from {0, 1}
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, sk from all the integers with Jacobi symbol 1 in ZNk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,m, then calculate ak = s2k
∏n
i=1 c
zi
i,j,k(
∏T1
t=1 C
wt
j,k,t,k′)
−1 mod Nk for k =
1, 2, . . . ,m to produce a proof transcript with the same distribution. Since the
two transcripts are indistinguishable when the challenges are randomly chosen,
the proof is zero knowledge if at least one co-auctioneer chooses his challenges
to Ak′ randomly.
Without the assumption that ci,j,k has Jacob symbol 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n,
the proof can be given similarly. The only difference is that the distribution
space becomes ZNk . 2
Theorem 4. The new sealed-bid auction scheme is correct. More precisely, if
each Ak′ passes all the T2 instances of verification in Section 4.2 with a probabil-
ity larger than 2−T2 and at least one auctioneer chooses the challenges randomly
in the verification in Section 4.2, the correct winning price is found with an
overwhelmingly large probability.
Proof: As each Ak′ passes all the T2 instances of verification in Section 4.2 with
a probability larger than 2−T2 , each Ak′ passes at least one of the T2 instances
of verification in Section 4.2 with a probability larger than 0.5. As at least one
auctioneer chooses the challenges randomly in the verification in Section 4.2,
according to Theorem 2
Cj,k,t,k′ = R2j,k,t,k′
n∏
i=1
c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k for k = 1, . . . ,m, t = 1, . . . , T1 and k
′ = 1, . . . ,m
So∏m
k=1 dj,k,t =
∏m
k=1Dk(
∏m
k′=1 Cj,k,t,k′) =
∏m
k=1Dk(
∏m
k′=1(R
2
j,k,t,k′
∏n
i=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k ))
for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1.
According to multiplicative homomorphism of the modified G-M encryption,
correctness of the modified G-M decryption guaranteed by the public correctness
proof of decryption and the decryption rule that the decryption of any quadratic
residue is 1, for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1:∏m
k=1 dj,k,t =
∏m
k=1Dk((
∏m
k′=1R
2
j,k,t,k′)
∏m
k′=1
∏n
i=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k )
=
∏m
k=1(Dk(
∏m
k′=1R
2
j,k,t,k′)Dk(
∏m
k′=1
∏n
i=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k ))
=
∏m
k=1Dk(
∏n
i=1
∏m
k′=1 c
ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k ) =
∏m
k=1Dk(
∏n
i=1 c
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k )
=
∏m
k=1
∏n
i=1Dk(c
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k ) =
∏m
k=1
∏n
i=1(Dk(ci,j,k))
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
=
∏m
k=1
∏n
i=1 b
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k =
∏n
i=1
∏m
k=1 b
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j,k
=
∏n
i=1(
∏m
k=1 bi,j,k)
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′ =
∏n
i=1 b
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j
Note that for any t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T1} at price pj ,
– if bi,j = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then
∏n
i=1 b
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j = 1;
– else then
∏n
i=1 b
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′
i,j = 1 with a probability 0.5 as (
∑m
k′=1 ri,j,t,k′)%2
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n are random (at least one auctioneer Ak′ randomly chooses
and conceals ri,j,t,k′ for i = 1, 2, . . . , n).
As
∏m
k=1 dj,k,t is tested for T1 times at price pj unless
∏m
k=1 dj,k,t = −1 is met,
– if bi,j = 1 for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, then
∏m
k=1 dj,k,t = 1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1;
– else then
∏m
k=1 dj,k,t = 1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 with a probability 2
−T1 .
So, bid opening at pj is correct with an overwhelmingly large probability
1 − 2−T1 . Therefore, the whole bid opening along the binary searching route is
correct with an overwhelmingly large probability. 2
The new sealed-bid auction scheme is computationally private. More pre-
cisely, no information about the losing bids is revealed other than what can be
deduced from the auction result if at least one auctioneer is honest and factor-
ization of the product of two large primes is computationally intractable. This
conclusion is based on the following important facts about bid privacy.
– The modified G-M encryption is semantically secure if factorization of the
product of two large primes is computationally intractable, so no information
about any bid is revealed from any encrypted choice if factorization of the
product of two large primes is computationally intractable.
– To get any information about the bids, the encrypted choices must be de-
crypted. However, ciphertext of each choice is randomly shared among the
auctioneers and every share is randomly chosen and independent of the corre-
sponding choice. So although every auctioneer can decrypt any choice share
encrypted with his public key, decryption of any choice requires cooperation
of all the auctioneers (called complete corporate decryption in this paper),
which is impossible when at least one auctioneer is honest.
– The decryption operations in the bid opening phase reveals no information
about the losing bids if at least one auctioneer is honest due to the following
reasons.
• If ∏mk=1Dk(∏mk′=1 Cj,k,t,k′) = 1 for t = 1, 2, . . . , T1 at a price pj , these
T1 complete corporate decryptions only reveal that there is no “YES”
choice at pj , which is deducible from the auction result. So no information
about bi,j for i = 1, 2, . . . , n which cannot be deduced from the auction
result is revealed.
• If∏mk=1Dk(∏mk′=1 Cj,k,t,k′) = −1 for a certain t in {1, 2, . . . , T}, it is only
revealed that there is at least one “YES” choice in a subset of the choices
at pj . If the subset is kept secret, the revealed information is deducible
from the auction result. Note that ri,j,t,k′ is (at least computationally)
hidden in Cj,k,t,k′ , while Theorem 3 indicates that the proof in Section 4.2
is zero knowledge when at least one auctioneer is honest. So ri,j,t,k′ for
i = 1, 2, . . . , n are retained secret and thus all the T1 chosen subsets are
kept secret when at least one auctioneer is honest. So no information
about bi,j for i = 1, 2, . . . , n which cannot be deduced from the auction
result is revealed when at least one auctioneer is honest.
Each operation in the auction protocol is publicly verifiable. Confidentiality
must have been achieved as bid privacy (a stronger requirement) is achieved. As
all the bids are signed by the bidders, no bidder can deny his bid if the signature
scheme is not forgeable. Correctness, confidentiality and undeniability together
guarantee fairness.
As the message space of the modified G-M encryption is {−1, 1}, containing
only “YES” choice and “NO” choice, any sealed choice is valid. So bid valid
check is not needed in the new auction scheme. However, a bidder may submit a
“YES” choice at a higher price while submitting a “NO” choice at a lower price,
namely submit a contradictory bid. To prevent a contradictory bid from winning,
a countermeasure can be taken: the winner must publish the encryption details
of all his sealed choices so that anyone can verify that his bid is not contradictory.
If a winner is found having submitted a contradictory bid, his bid is removed,
he may suffer a penalty and the bid opening is run again. As a bidder with a
contradictory bid cannot win, the highest valid bid always wins. So with this
countermeasure a contradictory bid cannot compromise the auction. In case of a
tie, any bidder with the winning bid other than the declared winner can publish
the encryption details of all his sealed choices so that anyone can verify that he
is a co-winner. Any tie-breaking mechanism can then be performed. The auction
protocol can properly deal with contradictory bid and tie and so is robust. Both
first-bid auction and Vickrey auction are supported in the new auction protocol.
Comparison of computational cost between the existing non-interactive auc-
tion schemes with bid privacy and the new auction scheme is made in Table 2
where first bid auction rule is adopted and multiplications are counted. Any full-
length integer is assumed to be 1024 bits long. A modulus exponentiation with
a x-bit exponent is regarded as 1.5x multiplications. The most efficient and pri-
vate non-interactive downward search auction, [7], and the most efficient secure
evaluation auction, [3], are taken as examples in the table. The most efficient
and private first-bid additive homomorphic auction [8] is taken as an example
of additive homomorphic auction. Although bid validity check is not adopted in
[8], in this example bid validity check is included for a fair comparison as it is
necessary for correctness and fairness of the auction. It is assumed that ElGa-
mal encryption is used (ElGamal encryption in secure evaluation auction and
downward search auction and modified ElGamal encryption [4] in additive ho-
momorphic auction). It is also assumed that RSA signature scheme is employed
in all the auction schemes. An example of the efficiency comparison is also given
in the table, where n = 1000, L = 4096, m = 3, T1 = T2 = 20.
Table 2. Efficiency comparison of non-interactive auction schemes with bid privacy
Auction Bidder Auctioneer
schemes multiplication example multiplication example
Secure evaluation 3072 log2 L + 1536 38400 337920n log2 L 4055040000
[3]
Downward search (1.5L + 1)1536+ 11492329 (0.5L(n + 3) + 1)1536+ 3158751721
[7] n(0.5L + 1) + 4609 2304n + n(0.5L + 1) + 1
Additive homomor- 12292nL + (10752 + 2n) log2 L
-phic auction [8] and 12291.5L + 1536 50346140 +1536(0.5n + 2) + 1537 50348957633
bid validity check
average ((0.5n + 1)m(T1 + T2)
Multiplicative 1.5L + 1536 7680 +(1.5m + 0.125n − 1)T1T2+ 1842661
homomorphic 1.25nT2 + 0.5T1 + 1) log2 L+
auction 1536(1 + (0.5T1 + 1) log2 L) + 1
It is demonstrated in Table 2 that the new auction scheme is the most ef-
ficient non-interactive sealed-bid auction scheme with bid privacy. The greater
the number of bidders and the number of biddable prices are2, the more obvious
this advantage is. Due to its high efficiency, a larger number of biddable prices
2 Usually the number of biddable prices must be at least several times larger than the
number of bidders to avoid a tie.
can be allowed to improve price flexibility. The computational cost of a bidder
is so low that he can use a low-capability device to bid while the non-interactive
communication pattern of the new auction scheme has a low requirement on the
communication channel.
6 Conclusion
A modified Goldwasser-Micali encryption algorithm is designed and employed
in a new sealed-bid auction. Low cost of the modified Goldwasser-Micali en-
cryption algorithm guarantees high efficiency of the new auction scheme. Costly
bid validity check is not necessary in the new auction scheme as the plaintext
space of the modified G-M encryption is the same as the message space of a bid-
ding choice. As multiplicative homomorphism of the modified Goldwasser-Micali
encryption algorithm is exploited in bid opening, the winning bid is efficiently
identified while all the losing bids are still kept secret after the auction. The new
auction scheme efficiently and practically achieves all the required properties of
sealed-bid auction. An open question is left: can the technique in this paper be
extended to the ith-bid auction?
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